Each validator candidate is encouraged to run its operations independently, as diverse setups increase the resilience of the network. Validator candidates should commence their setup phase now in order to be on time for launch.
Key Management - HSM
It is mission critical that an attacker cannot steal a validator's key. If this is possible, it puts the entire stake delegated to the compromised validator at risk. Hardware security modules are an important strategy for mitigating this risk. HSM modules must support
Sentry Nodes (DDOS Protection)
Validators are responsible for ensuring that the network can sustain denial of service attacks.
One recommended way to mitigate these risks is for validators is to carefully structure their network topology in a so-called sentry node architecture.
Validator nodes should only connect to full-nodes they trust because they operate them themselves or are run by other validators they know socially. This architecture shifts the burden of denial-of-service from the validator's node directly to its sentry nodes, and may require new sentry nodes be spun up or activated to mitigate attacks on existing ones.
Sentry nodes can be quickly spun up or change their IP addresses. Because the links to the sentry nodes are in private IP space, an internet based attacked cannot disturb them directly. This will ensure validator block proposals and votes always make it to the rest of the network.
To setup your sentry node architecture you can follow the instructions below:
Validators nodes should edit their config.toml:
# Comma separated list of nodes to keep persistent connections to # Do not add private peers to this list if you don't want them advertised persistent_peers =[list of sentry nodes] # Set true to enable the peer-exchange reactor pex = false
Sentry Nodes should edit their config.toml:
# Comma separated list of peer IDs to keep private (will not be gossiped to other peers) # Example ID: [email protected]:26656 private_peer_ids = "node_ids_of_private_peers"